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Jurisdiction and Its Effects
SCOTT DODSON*
Jurisdiction is experiencing an identity crisis. The Supreme Court has given
jurisdiction three different identities: jurisdiction as power jurisdiction as
defined effects, and jurisdiction as positive law. These identities are at war with
each other and each is unsustainable on its own. The result has been a
breakdown in the application of the basic question of what is jurisdictional and
what is not.
I aim to rehabilitate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is none of the three identities
above. Rather jurisdiction determines forum in a multiforum system. It seeks
not to limit a particular court in isolation but instead to define boundaries and
relationships among forums. Because it speaks to relationships generally, juris-
diction exhibits neither unique nor immutable effects. Instead, positive law can
prescribe whatever effects-including waivability, forfeitability, and even equi-
table discretion-best fit a particular jurisdictional rule.
This identity for jurisdiction resolves tensions across a wide range of doc-
trines. For example, it reconciles personal jurisdiction and original subject-
matter jurisdiction as jurisdictional kin, a pair long estranged because of
personal jurisdiction's waivability. Other categorizations are more surprising.
For example, venue, abstention, and even the Federal Arbitration Act are all
jurisdictional because they select among forums, whereas Article III standing is
nonjurisdictional because it does not. These categorizations are unconven-
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INTRODUCTION
JURISDICTION. The term is bandied about in law school classrooms,
courtroom chambers, congressional buildings, and law offices. But there is a
problem: we do not know what jurisdiction means.
Lamenting that "[j]urisdiction ... is a word of many, too many, meanings,"
the Supreme Court recently has pressed a deliberate agenda to bring sense to the
1. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States v. Vanness,
85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
JURISDICTION AND ITS EFFECTS
word by circumscribing its application and by calling for care and thoughtful-
ness in using the term jurisdiction.2 In large measure, these efforts have paid off.
Judges and commentators have attended more closely to jurisdictional issues. 3
And, although the doctrine is far from clean, the Court has offered some
guideposts for assisting the inquiry.4
In the process, the Court has imbued jurisdiction with multiple identities.
Because subject-matter jurisdiction is the "power" of a court,5 it has a unique
and immutable set of effects-unwaivable, unconsentable, able to be raised at
any time, mandatory and not amenable to equitable discretion, and obliging
judges to police its limits sua sponte-that are too costly to be imposed
indiscriminately.6 And to avoid these costs, courts must presume a rule to be
nonjurisdictional unless Congress makes its jurisdictional status clear. Thus,
the current approach treats jurisdiction as (1) the power of a court, (2) a label
for a defined set of effects, and (3) a creature of positive law.
This approach, which started as a productive effort to call attention to and
reduce profligate and unthinking use of the term jurisdiction, has begun to
stymie deeper interrogation of jurisdiction, causing difficulties in its application.
As I explain in more detail below, the notion of jurisdiction as power cannot
withstand scrutiny. If the term is just a proxy for a set of effects, then personal
jurisdiction, which can be waived, and mootness, which carries judicially
created exceptions, cannot be matters of jurisdiction. And a positivist concep-
tion of jurisdiction offers no useful meaning at all.
The cracks in jurisdictional theory and doctrine have begun to expose them-
selves. After a series of mostly unanimous decisions, the Court last term held
the limitations period of the Federal Tort Claims Act to be nonjurisdictional in
its opinion in United States v. Wong, which fractured the Court and revealed
deep incoherence within the Court's jurisdictional doctrine." In short, jurisdic-
tion is exhibiting symptoms of an acute identity crisis.
I aim to rehabilitate jurisdiction's identity by offering this definition: jurisdic-
tion determines forum in a multiforum legal system. It is a structural concept
that helps allocate cases, define boundaries, and maintain relationships among
competing forums. Jurisdiction, then, has inherent definitional and functional
2. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1630-33 (2015); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.
443,446-48 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 716-17 (2016). See generally Erin Morrow
Hawley, The Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution: Redefining the Meaning of Jurisdiction, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 2027 (2015); Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of "Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings,"
105 Nw. U. L. REv. 947 (2011).
4. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434-36 (2011) (stating that a judicial limit is
nonjurisdictional unless Congress clearly states otherwise and that context-including the Court's
interpretation of similar provisions in the past-is relevant to the determination).
5. See Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
6. See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2008).
7. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
8. Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632.
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meaning. Further, jurisdiction's effects are separate from its label; a jurisdic-
tional limit-just like a nonjurisdictional limit-could have some, all, or none
of the effects commonly tied to jurisdiction.9
The current approach thus has everything backwards. Jurisdiction is neither
an abstract notion of power nor a creature of congressional whim. Rather,
jurisdiction has an inchoate identity with functional significance that Congress
cannot alter. Yet Congress and positivism do have roles to play. Because
jurisdiction has neither unique nor immutable effects, Congress (or a court, if
appropriate) can supply whatever attendant effects best implement the underly-
ing goals of a particular jurisdictional limit.
Bestowing jurisdiction with an inherent identity divorced from its effects has
a number of salutary benefits. It refocuses attention on the very nature of
jurisdiction, enabling more precise-if unconventional-categorization of doc-
trines as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. As I will argue, jurisdictional doc-
trines include venue, forum non conveniens, exhaustion, and the Federal
Arbitration Act, whereas nonjurisdictional doctrines include standing, ripeness,
and mootness. Decoupling a doctrine's effects from its jurisdictional character
also permits the jurisdictional label to finally fit doctrines like personal jurisdic-
tion that have long seemed to be misnomers.
At the same time, jurisdiction's effects-less identity reconstitutes winnowed
lines of precedent. The phrase "mandatory and jurisdictional," once used regu-
larly by courts, has been disparaged more recently as a "drive-by jurisdictional"
phrase,o but jurisdiction's restored identity gives independent and productive
meaning to both the "mandatory" label (an effect) and the "jurisdictional" label
(a concept).
Reclaiming jurisdiction also offers a practical approach for litigation. Al-
though a limit's jurisdictional characterization is structurally and organization-
ally important, most litigation concerns the instrumental effects of the limit.
Litigants care less about whether a particular rule fits the jurisdictional defini-
tion and much more about whether it is waivable or susceptible to equitable
discretion. Thus, litigation about a particular rule should focus on its effects
instead of its jurisdictional character, a focus that the Supreme Court has
inverted in recent years."
The path to rehabilitating jurisdiction proceeds in three steps. Part I diagnoses
jurisdiction's crisis as reflecting an unstable tripartite identity, as illustrated by
the recent decision United States v. Wong. Part II then takes up the task of
putting jurisdiction in its rightful place as a structural concept untethered to a set
of effects. This Part also explores the implications of this identity restoration on
various doctrines. Finally, Part III addresses major counterarguments and
concerns.
9. See Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALiF. L. REv. 1439, 1457 (2011).
10. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
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I. JURISDICTION'S IDENTITY CRISIS
In its current conception, jurisdiction is subject to congressional definition,
and, because jurisdiction is power, a jurisdictional law has unique and immu-
table effects. But this conception is undermined by historical tensions, impover-
ished theorizing, and doctrinal inconsistencies that are coming to the fore. This
Part diagnoses jurisdiction's identity crisis.
A. IDENTITY
Although jurisdiction was an elastic and primarily procedural concept for the
nation's first century or so, 12 jurisdiction began to ossify in the latter half of the
1800s. 13 In 1884, the Court described jurisdiction as the fundamental "power"
of a federal court, elaborating: "[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits
of the judicial power of the United States, is inflexible and without excep-
tion .... On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is
that of jurisdiction .... "
The idea of jurisdiction as power, which continues today,15 leads inexorably
to unique and immutable effects: the parties can neither consent to jurisdiction
nor waive or forfeit jurisdictional defects; equitable doctrines and judicial
discretion cannot excuse jurisdictional defects; a jurisdictional defect can be
raised at any time, by any party, before final judgment; the court must verify
jurisdiction sua sponte; and judgments entered without jurisdiction are void. 16
Beginning in the early- and mid-1900s, courts routinely characterized judicial
limits as jurisdictional.17 The courts of appeals, in particular, began calling
12. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
13. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1838-40 (2007)
(documenting the early treatment of jurisdictional pleading); Dan B. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction
by Consent, 40 N.C. L. REV. 49, 54-79 (1961) (same); see also Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1208-09, 1253-54 (2001) (explaining how English equity
jurisdiction influenced the drafting of Article III).
14. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); see also McDonald
v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."); Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 235 (1908) (equating jurisdiction and power); cf Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (stating that jurisdiction is an antecedent condition that, if lacking, requires
dismissal).
15. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90; Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 22 (1981)
("The concept of subject-matter jurisdiction in our legal system refers to the motive force of a court, the
root power to adjudicate a specified set of controversies.").
16. See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951) (no equity); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237, 244 (1934) (unwaivable); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (voidness);
Swan, 111 U.S. at 382 (sua sponte duty); McNitt v. Turner, 83 U.S. 352, 366 (1872) (voidness and
subject to collateral attack).
17. Collins, supra note 13, at 1834; see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUAL-
ITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992) (documenting the rise of
diversity litigation since the late 1800s).
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limits "mandatory and jurisdictional," 8 and the Supreme Court picked up on
that tradition in the 1960 case of United States v. Robinson, when it similarly
characterized the deadline for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case.1 9
Robinson's repetition of the phrase "mandatory and jurisdictional" encouraged
profligate and indiscriminate employment of the jurisdictional label over the
next three decades.2 0
Beginning in the 1990s, the Court gradually became aware of its unreflective
obsession with jurisdiction and the carelessness it had engendered. In Carlisle v.
United States, the Court concluded that a district court could not grant a motion
for judgment of acquittal that was untimely under the deadline specified in the
Rules. 2 1 Justice Ginsburg, concurring, elaborated on the deadline's jurisdic-
tional stature:
It is anomalous to classify time prescriptions, even rigid ones, under the
heading "subject matter jurisdiction." That most basic requirement relates to
the subject matter of the case or controversy or the status of the parties to it.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) concerns a matter less basic. It is
simply a time prescription. Rule 29(c)'s prescription is a tight one, to be
sure[,] ... [but] not utterly exceptionless.2 2
And, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court explicitly
recognized that overuse of the jurisdictional label had spawned "drive-by
jurisdictional rulings" that should be accorded no precedential weight.2 3
The 2004 case Kontrick v. Ryan was a pathmarking decision and the Court's
first real effort to bring meaningful doctrinal exposition to jurisdictionality. 24
There, a bankruptcy creditor untimely objected-outside the sixty-day deadline
specified in Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a)-to a Chapter 7 debtor's discharge.2 5 The
18. Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 39 &
n.102 (1994) (tracing the phrase's development and noting "thousands of cases" that use it); Mark A.
Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REv. 399, 399 n.2, 406-07 (1986).
19. 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960); see also Scott Dodson, A Revolution in Jurisdiction, in THE LEGACY OF
RUTH BADER GINSBURG 137, 140 (Scott Dodson ed., 2015) ("Four times the Court characterized
appellate deadlines as 'mandatory and jurisdictional.' To be fair, the Court itself did not endorse that
characterization but rather noted how circuits had characterized it . . . .").
20. See, e.g., Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315-17 (1988); Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam); Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of Ill.,
434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978). The use even infected the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. See FED. R.
App. P. 3 advisory committee's note to 1967 adoption (characterizing as "mandatory and jurisdictional"
Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which prescribe the form and timing of a
notice of appeal in a civil case).
21. 517 U.S. 416, 421 (1996) ("There is simply no room in the text ... for the granting of an
untimely postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal . . . .").
22. Id. at 434-35 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Rule 29(c) provides the number of
days a defendant has to file a motion for judgment of acquittal. FED. R. CRuI. P. 29(c).
23. 523 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998).
24. 540 U.S. 443 (2004).
25. Id. at 446.
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debtor did not raise the untimeliness of the objection until after the bankruptcy
court had decided on the merits that the discharge should be refused.2 6 On
appeal, the debtor argued that the deadline was "jurisdictional," and, therefore,
its violation could be raised at any time.27
The Court rejected that characterization and held that Rule 4004(a) could not
be invoked after the bankruptcy court reached the merits. 28 According to the
Court, the deadline in Rule 4004(a) was nonjurisdictional because it was a
"claim-processing" rule that attached after jurisdiction had been established, as
opposed to a rule that defined the kinds of cases the courts could hear and
decide. 2 9 In a remarkable concession of past carelessness, with express refer-
ence to Robinson, the Court stated: "Courts, including this Court, it is true, have
been less than meticulous in this regard; they have more than occasionally used
the term 'jurisdictional' to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of
court." 3 0 Admonishing courts to be careful in future cases, the Court continued:
"Clarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional'
not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes
of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)
falling within a court's adjudicatory authority." 3 1
Two years and two successive Kontrick-like cases later,32 the Court held in
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. that the employee-numerosity requirement of Title
V11 3 3 is an element of the claim on the merits, not a matter of subject-matter
jurisdiction.3 4 The Court recognized that Congress could, if it chose, restrict
federal jurisdiction through such a statutory requirement.3 5 At the same time,
the Court recognized the costs of delineating a limit as jurisdictional, including
the ability of both parties to raise jurisdictional defects at any time, the inability
of courts to excuse noncompliance, and the duty of courts to police jurisdic-
tional limits sua sponte.36 The Court therefore tracked the "sounder course" of
adopting a presumption against jurisdictionality:
26. Id.
27. Id. at 446-47.
28. Id. at 447.
29. Id. at 454.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 455.
32. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam) (citing Kontrick to support
holding that the deadline for a motion for a new criminal trial is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing
rule); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-14 (2004) (citing Kontrick to support finding that the
thirty-day deadline for fee awards contained in the Equal Access to Justice Act is "not properly typed
'jurisdictional"').
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
34. 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006) (holding "that the numerical threshold does not circumscribe federal-
court subject-matter jurisdiction" but instead "relates to the substantive adequacy" of a Title VII claim).
35. Id. at 514-15 ("Of course, Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement 'jurisdic-
tional,' just as it has made an amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion in delineating diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.").
36. Id. at 514-15.
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If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's
scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly
instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress
does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. 3 7
Applying this presumption, the Court found no indication of jurisdictional-
ity.38 Nothing in the employee-numerosity provision spoke of jurisdiction, and
it was lodged in a section apart from the jurisdictional grants. It was a matter of
statutory coverage, not of jurisdictional authorization, to hear such claims.3 9
Since Arbaugh, the Court has refined jurisdictional doctrine by adding an
element of context, including past judicial treatment, as an index of congressio-
nal intent.4 0 Thus, a federal court confronted with a question of jurisdictionality
must consider, using textual and contextual cues, whether Congress has clearly
stated that the limit at issue is jurisdictional. If not, then the limit is nonjurisdic-
tional. If so, then a defined set of effects follow based on the idea of jurisdiction
as the power of the court.4 1
Importantly, the first part of the analysis is positivist: Congress gets to affix
the label as it wishes, and so the inquiry focuses on how Congress meant to
characterize the rule. The second part of the analysis, by contrast, is logically
deductive: because jurisdiction is the power of a court, its unique and immu-
table set of effects necessarily attach to Congress's choice of the jurisdictional
label.
B. CRISIS
The Court's recent effort to bring thoughtfulness to jurisdictional characteriza-
tions is commendable, and the results of its effort can fairly be called revolution-
ary.4 2 But the Court's approach has begun to reveal infirmities. 4 3 Consistent
with the recognition that jurisdiction "is a word of many, too many, mean-
ings,"" the Court has given jurisdiction at least three identities: jurisdiction as
37. Id. at 515-16 (citation omitted).
38. See id. at 515.
39. Id. at 504, 515.
40. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010) ("[C]ontext, including th[e]
Court's interpretation of similar provisions in many years past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks a
requirement as jurisdictional."); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 & n.2 (2007) (relying on "a
century's worth of precedent" in holding a civil appellate deadline jurisdictional).
41. See, e.g., Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 (reasoning that, because a limit is jurisdictional, equitable
exceptions cannot apply).
42. Dodson, supra note 19, at 148 ("One great virtue is [the Court's] effort to spark critical thought
in the nature and role of jurisdiction .. .. The days of thoughtless, 'drive-by' jurisdictional rulings are
largely over.").
43. See id. at 148-49 ("[T]he Court's focus on the jurisdictional-characterization question, while a
marked improvement from the blas6 approach to jurisdictionality reflected in cases like Robinson and
its progeny, risks stagnation.").
44. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States v.
Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
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basic power or authority, jurisdiction as a defined set of effects, and jurisdiction
as positive law. These three identities are inconsistent with each other, and none
is coherent on its own.
1. Jurisdiction as Basic Power or Authority
Since the late 1800s, the Court has often called jurisdiction something basic
and fundamental that goes to the power of the court to hear and adjudicate a
case. 4 5 But, as Evan Lee has demonstrated, this familiar refrain lacks founda-
tion. 4 6 "Power" cannot mean "ability," for nothing physically or intellectually
prevents a court from adjudicating a dispute over which it lacks jurisdiction. 7 A
jurisdictional barrier is not a force field. Nor can jurisdiction mean capacity to
enter an enforceable judgment,4 8 for even a judgment entered without jurisdic-
tion can become binding, enforceable, and unassailable.4 9
A more watered down definition might be legitimate authority to enter
judgment,5 0 but even that formulation has been undermined by the Court's
resequencing cases, which give a federal court the legal authority to enter a
binding judgment on procedural grounds even while questioning its own
jurisdiction.
In addition, the formulation of jurisdiction as legitimate authority renders it
conceptually indistinguishable from the many nonjurisdictional elements that
also inform legitimate authority.52 Fraud on the court, suborned perjury, bribed
judges or jurors, and the like affect the legitimacy of any adjudication in
character and degree indistinguishable from whether, say, the amount in contro-
versy exceeds a jurisdictional threshold. Even an error in procedure or on the
merits-such as a judge who refuses to allow any discovery, always grants
summary judgment, attempts to certify an unauthorized class action, or attempts
to award a trillion dollars in punitive damages-affects the legitimacy of any
45. See supra note 14; cf Jurisdiction, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("a court's power to
decide a case or issue a decree"). For an extended exposition of this identity, see Dane, supra note 18,
at 21-29.
46. Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGs L.J. 1613, 1618-19 (2003).
47. See id. at 1616-17.
48. Cf Dane, supra note 18, at 32 ("If a court does not have jurisdiction, its actions do not bind.").
49. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963); United States v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 330 U.S. 258, 289-95 (1947); Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377
(1940).
50. Cf Wasserman, supra note 3, at 961 (calling jurisdiction "a court's root structural constitutional
and statutory authority to adjudicate").
51. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425, 431 (2007) (allowing
dismissal for forum non conveniens without first resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction); cf Dane, supra note 18, at 31-32 (arguing that if jurisdiction is fundamental
authority, then a court cannot resequence a nonjurisdictional basis for decision prior to establishing
jurisdictional certainty).
52. See Lee, supra note 46, at 1620-21; cf Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction,
151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 502 (2002) (exploring the idea of jurisdiction as legitimacy in the global
context).
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resulting judgment's authority.53 Indeed, observers are quite likely to character-
ize each of these instances as an action that lacks authority.54
Perhaps jurisdiction can be defined by its opposite. As discussed above, the
Court recently has taken to contrasting jurisdiction with "claim-processing
rules."5 5 But this contrast with claim-processing rules proves unworkable in
practice. 6 Consider, for example, claim preconditions,5 certificates of appeal-
ability,58 the deadline to file a notice of appeal, 5 9 and statutes of limitations.6 0
Are these claim-processing rules? The Supreme Court has treated them inconsis-
tently, and I have yet to see any conceptual feature that distinguishes claim-
processing rules from jurisdictional limits. Justice Scalia was correct in his
dissent in Gonzalez v. Thaler: the dichotomy is not between jurisdictional limits
and claim-processing rules but between jurisdictional limits and nonjurisdic-
tional limits.
Further, the contrast between jurisdictional limits on power and nonjurisdic-
tional claim-processing rules is destabilized by the Court's own positivist
approach of deferring to Congress's characterizations of what is jurisdictional
and what is not. As the Court has conceded, Congress can make otherwise
claim-processing rules jurisdictional. In Henderson v. Shinseki, for example, the
Court stated:
Among the types of rules that should not be described as jurisdictional are
what we have called "claim-processing rules." These are rules that seek to
promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take
53. See Dodson, supra note 9, at 1450-51; Lee, supra note 46, at 1614 ("[T]here is no hard
conceptual difference between jurisdiction and the merits.").
54. See, e.g., In re Courtright, No. 05-21672REF, at 4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2006) (mem.)
(noting the defendant's argument that the judge "lacked jurisdiction to award punitive damages").
55. See supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1.
56. See Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1457, 1467
(2006) (arguing that "the distinction is not sufficient to solve the problem" because "[a]ny rule can be
read to describe the classes of cases courts can hear"); cf Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.
154, 161 (2010) ("While perhaps clear in theory, the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and
claim-processing rules can be confusing in practice.").
57. Compare Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328-30 (1976) (characterizing the Social Security
Act's presentation requirement as jurisdictional), with Reed Elsevier Inc., 559 U.S. at 157 (holding the
registration precondition for a copyright claim to be nonjurisdictional).
58. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012) (holding one part of the habeas requirements
for a certificate of appealability to be jurisdictional and a different part to be nonjurisdictional).
59. Compare Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam) (characterizing the
deadline to file a criminal notice of appeal as nonjurisdictional), with Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
213 (2007) (holding the deadline to file a civil notice of appeal to be jurisdictional).
60. Compare Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (holding the deadline to
file notice of appeal in Title VII to be nonjurisdictional), with John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 552 U.S. 130, 134, 139 (2008) (affirming jurisdictional dismissal of a complaint filed outside the
"more absolute" limitations period to file a claim with the Court of Federal Claims).
61. See 132 S. Ct. at 664-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have said that the universe of rules placing
limitations upon the courts is divided into (1) 'claims processing rules,' and (2) jurisdiction-removing
rules. Unless our prior jurisprudence is to be repudiated, that is a false dichotomy .... The proper
dichotomy is between claims processing rules that are jurisdictional, and those that are not.").
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certain procedural steps at certain specified times. Filing deadlines, such as
the 120-day filing deadline at issue here, are quintessential claim-processing
rules .... [But] the question before us is not quite that simple because
Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to
a rule that we would prefer to call a claim-processing rule. The question here,
therefore, is whether Congress mandated that the 120-day deadline be
"jurisdictional. ,62
Thus, the distinction between jurisdictional limits on power or authority and
claim-processing rules-if a workable distinction even exists-cannot be key to
jurisdiction's identity.
2. Jurisdiction as Effects
A more radical view is that jurisdiction has no inherent identity but rather is a
mere label that represents a defined set of effects: a jurisdictional requirement is
neither consentable nor stipulable by the parties and must be policed by the
court sua sponte; and the requirement's noncompliance can be raised by any
party any time before final judgment, is nonwaivable and nonforfeitable, and
cannot be excused by judicial discretion or application of principles of equity.6 3
Equating jurisdiction with its effects relies on the premises that jurisdiction's
effects are immutable and unique, that is, a jurisdictional characterization
necessarily leads to all these effects and a nonjurisdictional characterization
necessarily leads to none of them. These premises are oft-repeated by courts and
64
commentators. 6 The Sixth Circuit, for example, recently stated: "[J]urisdic-
tional rules are mandatory; therefore, their time limits cannot be waived. On the
other hand, claim-processing rules are not jurisdictional-thus, their time limits
can be waived." 6 5 Both premises are mistaken.
I begin with the latter premise of uniqueness. The effects typically associated
with jurisdiction are not unique to jurisdiction. Nonjurisdictional rules can
have some or even all of the effects commonly associated with jurisdiction by
being unsusceptible to equitable exceptions or discretion, nonconsentable or
unwaivable or nonforfeitable, or obligated to be policed by the court sua
62. 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011); see also Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 649; Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514-15 (2006) ("Of course, Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement
'jurisdictional,' just as it has made an amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of subject-matter
jurisdiction in delineating diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.").
63. See Dodson, supra note 6, at 3.
64. See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) ("A statute of limitations defense ... is
not 'jurisdictional,' hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte."); Kontrick v.
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004) ("Characteristically, a court's subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be
expanded to account for the parties' litigation conduct; a claim-processing rule, on the other hand,.. . can
nonetheless be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point."); Dane, supra
note 18, at 12 (stating that a jurisdictional characterization "always rests on an explicit con-
trast. . . . [I]f a time limit is jurisdictional, the court will read it or treat it one way; if it is not
jurisdictional, the court will read it or treat it another way").
65. Cook v. United States, 246 F. App'x 990, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.
205, 209-13 (2007)).
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sponte.® The habeas statute makes its nonjurisdictional exhaustion requirement
nonforfeitable and subject to sua sponte consideration. The nonjurisdictional
criminal deadline to appeal resists application of equitable principles and judi-
cial discretion. Other examples abound. Jurisdiction's effects are not unique.
Nor are jurisdiction's effects immutable. Despite common intonations to the
contrary,69 jurisdictional rules can have fewer, even none, of the effects com-
monly associated with jurisdiction.7 0 Take, for instance, the appellate-
jurisdiction requirement of a civil notice of appeal, which the Court has held to
be jurisdictional . 7  The statute governing the requirement's deadline allows a
court to extend the deadline for filing the notice for good cause and even allows
a court to reopen the time period after expiration for certain equitable reasons.7 2
Further, the requirement that the notice be "filed" 73 is subject to a judicial
exception for prisoners who "can file . .. only by delivering [the notices] to
prison authorities for forwarding to the appropriate district court." 7 4 And even
the requirement of a notice of appeal is excusable if the functional equivalent is
provided. The upshot is that, although the jurisdictional line requires the filing
of a notice of appeal within a prescribed deadline, a litigant could successfully
meet that jurisdictional requirement by not filing something other than the
notice of appeal outside of the deadline.
The key, however, is that these equitable and discretionary effects do not
necessarily render the appellate requirements nonjurisdictional. The notice-of-
appeal requirement can still draw a jurisdictional line; that jurisdictional line
would simply incorporate the contours created by certain principles of equity
and discretion. A line need not be straight to be jurisdictional.
The same can be said for litigant waiver. Nothing inherently prevents a
jurisdictional line from accommodating party conduct.7 7 For example, a plain-
tiff's good-faith allegation suffices to establish the amount in controversy for
diversity-jurisdiction purposes.78 If the defendant challenges diversity jurisdic-
tion based on the amount in controversy, then the plaintiff has the burden to
66. See Dodson, supra note 6, at 3, 6.
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2012); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133 (1987).
68. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (setting out an immutable set of
effects for jurisdiction).
70. Dodson, supra note 9, at 1457. For a different story of jurisdiction's flexibility, see generally
Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REv. 971 (2009).
71. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2012).
73. Id. § 2107(a).
74. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 268 (1988).
75. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992) (treating an appellate brief as a notice of appeal).
76. See Dodson, supra note 9, at 1458 ("This may result in jurisdictional boundaries that are more
circuitous than straight, but they are no less jurisdictional.").
77. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2012) (allowing an extension of the time to appeal if, and only if,
a party timely files a motion for an extension).
78. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938).
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prove the threshold is met by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 9 But if the
defendant does not lodge a challenge, the plaintiff's good-faith allegation
controls, even if the amount in controversy does not, in fact, exceed the
jurisdictional threshold.8 o The parties' pleading choices can thus establish juris-
diction even when the amount in controversy is, in fact, below the threshold.
Jurisdiction's effects, then, are not immutable.
Equating jurisdiction with its effects also brings different jurisdictional doc-
trines into tension with each other. Subject-matter jurisdiction is, customarily,
mandatory and nonwaivable. Yet mootness, a doctrine derived from Article III
jurisdiction, is subject to the judicially-created "capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review" exception."' And personal jurisdiction is waivable, forfeitable, and
consentable.8 2 If jurisdictional doctrines all exhibit uniform effects, someone is
missing something.
3. Jurisdiction as Positive Law
The Court's modern approach relegates jurisdiction to little more than a
positivist label to be affixed at Congress's whim: a limit is jurisdictional when
Congress clearly denotes it as such.8 3 I have no quarrel with Congress's
constitutional prerogative to limit the authority of the federal courts.8 4 My
concern is in distinguishing between jurisdictional limits of authority and
nonjurisdictional limits of authority. The positivist conception of jurisdiction
presumes that the distinction itself is a matter of positive law: there is no
inherent substance to jurisdiction other than the label that Congress affixes and
the effects that flow from that label. 5
Such a conceptualization renders itself irrelevant except as a proxy for a
defined set of effects. The jurisdictional label does no real definitional work and
has no independent meaning other than to prescribe what effects flow from it. 6
And as explained above, the jurisdiction-as-effects identity is itself incoherent.
79. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442,446 (1942).
80. See Dodson, supra note 9, at 1467.
81. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 938 (2011).
82. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991).
83. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006) (establishing a clear-statement rule
for jurisdiction); Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 717 (2016) (reaffirming Arbaugh's
clear-statement rule).
84. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting Congress the power to "ordain and establish" inferior
courts); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993) ("Congress has the constitutional
authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts . . . ."). Endowing Congress with primary
control over the authority of the courts does not necessarily empower Congress to define what is
jurisdictional. See infra text accompanying note 260.
85. Cf Lee, supra note 46, at 1629 ("[W]e should recognize jurisdiction as a creation of positive
law .... To put it crudely, if the legislature says there is such a thing as jurisdiction, then judges and
lawyers are to act as if there is such a thing as jurisdiction.").
86. A positivist conception could serve as a trigger for effects prescribed elsewhere, such as in the
removal/remand context. See infra text accompanying note 100. However, any prescribed effects are
either redundant of the expected effects or are in tension with the expected effects. See, e.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(h) (allowing, consistent with typical jurisdictional effects, subject-matter jurisdiction to be
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The positivist identity also suffers from its own infirmities. If Congress can
deploy the jurisdictional label as it sees fit, the Supreme Court's imposition of a
clear-statement rule disfavoring jurisdiction undermines congressional pri-
macy.8 7 Further, because Congress so rarely speaks directly to court jurisdic-
tion, a positivist approach proves difficult in many instances, and the Court's
own approach has spawned inconsistencies and complexities in its attempts to
divine congressional intent that, in all likelihood, never existed. 8
Finally, the identity of jurisdiction as a positivist creation of Congress offers
no explanation for nonstatutory doctrines, such as Article III standing, personal
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, court rules, abstention, sovereign immunity,
the independent-and-adequate-state-grounds doctrine, and the like. One could
reach these nonstatutory doctrines by extending the positivist identity of juris-
diction to other sources of law beyond acts of Congress, but then it is unclear
how the Court's clear-statement rule would operate in these contexts and what
would happen if various positivist sources affixed conflicting labels to the same
doctrine.
4. United States v. Wong
Last term's opinion in United States v. Wong, consolidated with the substan-
tially similar case United States v. June, illustrates jurisdiction's identity crisis.89
There, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held the limitations period of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) susceptible to equitable tolling. The FTCA
waives the United States' sovereign immunity under certain conditions. One
condition is the statutory time provision, making an FTCA claim "forever
barred" if not timely asserted.9 0 Both Kwai Fun Wong and Marlene June filed
claims that were untimely under the FTCA, but the Ninth Circuit held that both
could proceed as timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. 91
Although the sole issue before the Court was whether the limitations period
in § 2401(b) was susceptible to equitable tolling, the Court framed the case as a
question of whether the limitations period was jurisdictional.9 2 In the process,
raised any time, but requiring, in tension with typical jurisdictional effects, personal jurisdiction to be
raised in the first responsive pleading).
87. See Hawley, supra note 3, at 2031.
88. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012) (holding one provision jurisdictional
and a different but closely related provision nonjurisdictional); Henderson ex rel Henderson v. Shinseki,
562 U.S. 428, 436 (2011) (disclaiming Congress's need to use magical words to type a limit as
jurisdictional); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-10, 212-13 (2007) (finding that Congress's
limitation on judges' ability to extend the notice-of-appeal period suggests it intended the deadline to be
jurisdictional rather than a claim-processing rule). For a different attack on the positivist theory of
jurisdiction, see Lees, supra note 56, at 1476-77 (arguing that legislative intent often is too ambiguous
to allow for positivist application of the jurisdiction label).
89. United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012) (rendering a tort claim against the United States "forever barred"
unless presented to the appropriate federal agency within two years after the claim accrues and brought
to federal court within six months after the agency acts on the claim).
91. Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
92. Id. at 1631-32.
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the Court zigzagged through the entire gamut of errors discussed above. The
Court characterized jurisdiction as power and as contrasted with claim-
processing rules.93 The Court also resorted to a positivist approach to jurisdic-
tion, stating: "Congress must do something special, beyond setting an exception-
free deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a
court from tolling it." 94 And the Court equated a jurisdictional characterization
with the typical effects of jurisdiction, stating that if Congress made the
deadline jurisdictional, then "a litigant's failure to comply with the bar deprives
a court of all authority to hear a case."95
None of these heuristics advanced the Court's analysis. The statutory limit at
issue-making a claim "forever barred" by sovereign immunity if not timely
asserted-is neither clearly a limit on judicial power nor clearly a mode of
processing a claim. The unusual language "forever barred" was not helpful to
the positivist approach either, for the majority and dissent each claimed textual
support for its respective characterization.96 Even while equating jurisdiction
with its effects, the Court seemed to recognize that the time bar could resist
equitable tolling even if characterized as nonjurisdictional. 97 The Court's laser
focus on the jurisdictional character of the FTCA's limitations period obscured
the entire issue at stake for the parties: whether equitable tolling is available to
excuse noncompliance with the FTCA's time bar.
Wong is symptomatic of the growing incoherence of the Court's jurisdictional-
ity jurisprudence, and its lesson is clear: it is time to set jurisdiction straight.
II. REHABILITATING JURISDICTION
So, what is jurisdiction? And how is it related to the effects commonly
associated with jurisdiction? This Part answers those questions.
A. DETERMINING FORUM, DECOUPLING EFFECTS
I begin by affirming that jurisdiction has a legitimate place in our legal
lexicon. 98 This affirmance is not based on the impracticality of eradicating the
concept altogether, as some have considered.9 9 Impracticality is, no doubt, a
93. Id. at 1632.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1631.
96. Id. at 1632-33; id. at 1640-42 (Alito, J., dissenting).
97. Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1631 n.2 (recognizing that Congress could insulate even a nonjurisdictional
time bar from equitable tolling).
98. Others are skeptical that jurisdiction has any distinct inherent meaning. See, e.g., Lee, supra note
46, at 1614. But see id. at 1622 n.30 (conceding that jurisdiction "serves an important choice-of-forum
function, and to that extent it is functionally distinguishable from the merits").
99. Professor Wasserman has been at the forefront of the merits/jurisdiction dichotomy and is a
strong proponent of moving most-if not all-merits issues out of the jurisdictional basket. See
Wasserman, supra note 3, at 954. See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and
Non-Extant Rights, 56 KAN. L. REV. 227 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80
WASH. L. REV. 643 (2005).
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strong barrier to eradication, for jurisdiction already undergirds much jurispru-
dence, which is by now too far committed to the existence of something called
jurisdiction. Indeed, the law often expressly depends upon jurisdictional charac-
terizations. For example, the removal statute requires remand at any time a
defect in subject-matter jurisdiction is found but conditions remand on a timely
remand motion for any other defect. 0 0 For practical reasons, jurisdiction must
continue to exist as a term. 10
But I mean to press something more affirmative. Jurisdiction has value
beyond the avoidance of impracticability. It is important for inherent reasons,
and those inherent reasons cabin Congress's ability to affix the label at its whim.
Jurisdiction's identity is this: it determines forum in a multiforum system.
Importantly, jurisdiction does not speak to the authority of a single court in
isolation; it is not meant to answer the question of whether a particular court can
adjudicate a dispute (though it often will answer that question). Rather, jurisdic-
tion defines both where a dispute belongs and where it does not. It is inherently
a relational concept, an organizing force that either resolves or encourages
territorial disputes within a community of forums. Jurisdiction provides answers
to the following questions: When can a case be filed in federal or state court?
When does a case move from district to appellate court? Which states' courts
can hear a case and which cannot? Which federal districts within a state can
hear the case? When must dispute resolution take place before an arbitrative, an
executive, or a legislative body instead of a court? Jurisdiction erects both the
fences that separate forums and the gates that cases may pass through. 102
Crucially, jurisdictionality does not depend on the mere existence of alternate
forums. Otherwise, every judicial limit would be jurisdictional. A plaintiff
unable to seek judicial relief because of a statute of limitations in one court
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012). For a framework for resolving jurisdictional-characterization
questions in the removal context, see generally Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102
Nw. U. L. REv. 55 (2008).
101. See Lee, supra note 46, at 1628 ("[B]anishing the term 'jurisdiction' from our legal lexicon is
out of the question.").
102. I am not the first to suggest that jurisdiction has meaning along these lines. Some years ago,
Alex Lees proposed that jurisdiction should reflect rules that shift authority between law-speaking
institutions in a manner similar to my definition. See Lees, supra note 56, at 1478. But whereas my
definition is primarily descriptive, his is normative, relying on underlying explanatory policies implement-
ing positivist choice-of-forum preferences. See id. This leads him to suggest that the employee-
numerosity requirement in Arbaugh might be jurisdictional, id. at 1496 n.130, a result I disclaim. Lees
is forced into this "important qualification" because he erroneously takes jurisdictional effects as given.
Indeed, he argues that jurisdiction should settle boundaries between law-speaking institutions precisely
because of the rigid effects that should accompany such boundary lines. Id. at 1460. He thus cannot
explain how waivable boundaries like personal jurisdiction or venue can be jurisdictional and he makes
no attempt to do so. Further, his commitment to effects leads him to conclude that standing is
jurisdictional, id. at 1481-84, whereas my definition suggests the opposite. For related takes on
jurisdiction in the international context, see Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1003 (2006); S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782: Distinguishing International
Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295,
342-48 (2013).
634
JURISDICTION AND ITS EFFECTS
perhaps could seek relief in a different court that might apply a different
limitations period. 10 3 If no court is available, perhaps the plaintiff can seek
legislative or executive solutions. If those prospects fail, the plaintiff can seek
extralegal recourse through self-help. The availability of alternative paths does
not make all limitations on one forum jurisdictional. Rather, jurisdiction must
group or divide the forum possibilities. This key feature distinguishes, for
example, statutes of limitations (which limit one court's authority independent
of the availability or unavailability of other forums) from the doctrine of forum
non conveniens (which limits a court's authority because of the availability of
more convenient forums).
Any law that determines forum in a multiforum system, then, is properly
typed "jurisdictional." Some doctrines customarily considered jurisdictional,
such as diversity and federal-question jurisdiction, easily fit this definition, but
others customarily considered nonjurisdictional fit too. Exhaustion require-
ments, for example, determine forum by diverting a dispute from one forum
into another. Thus, obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) before suing under Title VII is a jurisdic-
tional demarcation between an executive agency and a court. Similarly, the
requirement that an appellant file a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional require-
ment because filing establishes a boundary dividing authority between the
district and appellate courts. A nonexhaustive list of jurisdictional doctrines,
some of which are conventionally jurisdictional and others of which are not,
includes the following:
* Federal-question jurisdiction (including exclusive federal jurisdiction);
* Diversity jurisdiction;
* Supplemental jurisdiction;
* Removal and remand;
* Appellate jurisdiction (including certificates of appealability, the finality




* Forum non conveniens;
* Exhaustion;
* Abstention;
* State-court certification; and
* The Federal Arbitration Act.
Each of these is properly typed jurisdictional because it determines forum in
a multiforum system.
103. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519-20 (1990) (holding that a transferee
court must apply the law of the transferor court, even if the claim was strategically brought in the
transferor court to avoid a statute of limitations bar in the transferee court).
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Any law that does not determine forum in a multiforum system cannot be
called jurisdictional. Statutes of limitations, for example, do not determine
forum in a multiforum system. These instead speak to the viability of recovery
in a particular court. Likewise, issues of statutory coverage-like the employee-
numerosity requirement of Title VII-are claim requirements, not forum determi-
nants. These speak to whether a particular case can be heard but not to case
allocation among forums. A nonexhaustive list of nonjurisdictional rules in-
cludes the following:
* Limits on remedies (such as caps on damages or injunctive relief,
limitations periods, or requirements for fee shifting);




* Standards of review; and
* Standing, ripeness, and mootness.
These are nonjurisdictional because they address the competency of a court to
adjudicate a particular dispute in isolation from that court's relationship with
other adjudicative bodies. 104
These groupings make for some odd doctrinal bedfellows. Standing is akin to
a limitations period. Venue is of the same ilk as diversity jurisdiction. But these
pairings are odd primarily because we have tended to think of jurisdiction in
terms of its effects rather than as a structural principle about organizing forums.
Venue somehow seems less jurisdictional than diversity jurisdiction because
venue can be forfeited,1 0 5 and standing somehow seems more jurisdictional than
a limitations period because it is a constitutional limit that cannot be satisfied by
party consent. 106
But when freed from effects-based definitions, categorizing venue as jurisdic-
tional and standing as nonjurisdictional makes great sense. As I explain in detail
below, venue, like diversity jurisdiction, allocates cases among courts by de-
termining which courts can hear the case and which cannot, and it helps draw
104. Domestic-official immunity in the United States is federal preemptive law, meaning that it
applies equally in federal and state courts. Accordingly, it is not a jurisdictional, forum-selection
doctrine but rather a nonjurisdictional, global immunity doctrine. Foreign-official immunity, by con-
trast, rests on the presumption that the foreign official is entitled to immunity in foreign courts because
the official is subject to suit in her own country's courts. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14) (relying on the presumption that
"such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their own countries, and may thus
be tried by those countries' courts in accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law"). Thus,
foreign-official immunity might appropriately be characterized as jurisdictional. I am grateful to Bill
Dodge for pointing this nuance out to me.
105. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(A) (a defendant's objection to improper venue is waived if not
brought timely).
106. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (discussing standing's origins in Article III).
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boundaries of authority among adjudicative forums. By contrast, standing does
not determine forum in a multiforum system because it speaks only to the
limitations of the forum court to grant relief, just as a statute of limitations or
a damages cap does. True, party preferences can influence venue but not
standing. But that does not make venue any less, or standing any more, forum-
determinative.
Jurisdiction, then, properly describes any boundary or bridge between fo-
rums. It is not a positivist term such that Congress can affix it as it wishes, nor a
label for a certain set of effects, nor a normative term applied only when
justified by certain systemic policies. Rather, jurisdiction is inherently descrip-
tive of boundaries that separate or group forums. Neither Congress nor the
courts can change this identity. Thus, it is not true, as the Supreme Court
presumed, that Congress could make Title VII's employee-numerosity require-
ment jurisdictional simply by calling it so. 1 0 7 Nor could Congress make venue
nonjurisdictional. Jurisdiction has its own definition.
Congress can, however, exert some control over the effects of a particular
jurisdictional law, as can the courts under appropriate circumstances. Nothing
inherent in jurisdiction's identity necessarily precludes consideration of party
preference, judicial discretion, or the equities. These features ought to be
considered part of the lawmaking authority's arsenal for maintaining workabil-
ity and fairness in the legal landscape. os Congress can, for example, make the
deadline to file a notice of appeal, or even the notice of appeal itself, subject to
principles of equity or to the preferences of the parties.1 09 By the same token,
Congress could decide that a particular jurisdictional line is too important for
systemic reasons to leave to the influence of the parties or the courts, and thus it
might make the line nonwaivable, nondiscretionary, and even subject to sua
sponte policing by the courts. Positive law, then, can prescribe whatever effects
best fit a particular jurisdictional line.
B. REORIENTING DOCTRINE
The characterization groupings above warrant further explanation. This Sec-
tion explores those groupings and shows that jurisdiction's rehabilitated identity
offers new insights and resolves some of the most intransigent doctrinal conflicts.
107. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514-16 (2006). If Congress had created a cause of
action against employers who did not meet the employee-numerosity requirement but required that such
a claim be lodged exclusively in state court, then the employee-numerosity requirement would have
been jurisdictional.
108. Of course, in a hierarchical legal system, an institution with supremacy over another can set
effects that the subordinate institution cannot alter. If, for example, the Constitution establishes a
particular effect for a particular jurisdictional line, Congress cannot alter it. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (holding that Congress cannot grant the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution allows).
109. Indeed, Congress has already seen fit to empower judicial discretion in consideration of the
equities in the deadline to file a civil notice of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2012) (providing for
extensions based on "excusable neglect or good cause").
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1. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction
Few will need convincing that the traditional doctrines of original district-
court jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction are, indeed, jurisdictional. Still, they
contain tensions that can be alleviated by jurisdiction's new identity.
Federal-question jurisdiction (including exclusive federal jurisdiction), diver-
sity jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, and removal all determine forum in
a multiforum federalist system comprising both federal and state courts.110
These doctrines help define when federal or state courts can, should, or must
hear a case.
Most facets of these jurisdictional doctrines are easily typed jurisdictional, so
I will focus discussion on the more controversial of the group: removal and
remand procedure and declinations of supplemental jurisdiction. Many courts
have held removal and remand to be nonjurisdictional1 because they are
primarily matters of procedure governing the movement of a case that already
qualifies for original federal jurisdiction. 1 12 However, those rulings have not
been without controversy. 1 13
If jurisdiction is to describe both fences and gates, then it must describe
removal and remand procedure as well. The deadline to remove is not a limit on
a claim for relief like a statute of limitations. It is a limit on the eligibility of the
case for a federal forum, just as surely as the amount-in-controversy require-
ment is a limit on the eligibility of the case for a federal forum under diversity
jurisdiction. 114
Importantly, the jurisdictional status of the mechanical features of removal
and remand does not lead to an established set of effects. The label is descrip-
tive, not prescriptive. Thus, it would be perfectly appropriate for Congress to
provide that defects in the mechanics of removal or remand, even if they are
descriptively jurisdictional, can still be forfeitable.1 1 5
In contrast with removal, supplemental jurisdiction is more firmly accepted as
jurisdictional. The supplemental-jurisdiction statute, however, contains an odd
provision that allows a federal court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion under certain circumstances.1 1 6 This grant of discretion to district courts to
dismiss or remand to allow state courts to hear the supplemental claims is
110. See id. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367, 1441.
111. See Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631, 640 (2008).
112. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (allowing removal of cases over which district courts have
original jurisdiction). But see Dodson, supra note 100, at 62-63 (identifying independent jurisdictional
grants in the removal statute).
113. Dodson, supra note 100, at 64-65.
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
115. Congress complicated matters by making nonforfeitable only "defect[s] . . . of subject matter
jurisdiction." See id. § 1447(c). One way out is to construe Congress's use of the term "subject matter
jurisdiction" to refer not to all jurisdictional matters but only to the description of "original jurisdiction"
in the removal grant. See id. § 1441(a).
116. See id. § 1367(c).
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similar to abstention' 1 7 and is typically thought of as nonjurisdictional, primar-
ily because it involves the exercise of discretion."" But its discretionary nature
should make no difference. Both the statute and a district court's exercise of
discretion help determine the forum (state or federal court) for adjudication.
Thus, even the discretionary portion of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute is
jurisdictional.
Appellate jurisdiction, too, is jurisdictional. Appellate jurisdiction contains a
number of requirements, including a timely and complete notice of appeal,11 9
the existence of a final judgment from which to appeal, 12 0 and any statutory
certificates of appealability that are required as a precondition to an appeal. 121
Like removal, these details effectuate the transition of the case from one court
to another and thus they all are properly typed jurisdictional.
Bowles v. Russell, therefore, was correct in describing as jurisdictional the
deadline to file a civil notice of appeal. 122 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion,
the nature of the appellate deadline is not akin to a limitations period. 12 3 The
appellate deadline implements the passage of a case across a boundary demarcat-
ing the authority of a district court and an appellate court. A limitations period,
by contrast, sets a requirement for claim resolution in a particular court without
regard to other courts. The former is jurisdictional; the latter, nonjurisdictional.
The same can be said for all other requirements at the boundary between
district courts and courts of appeals: the finality requirement, the contents of the
notice, the signature requirement, the identification of parties and issues, and a
complete certificate of appealability if required. 12 4 In addition, the boundary
between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court is jurisdictional in both
criminal and civil matters, 12 5 notwithstanding inconsistent precedent to the
contrary. 126
117. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87
CALIF. L. REv. 1409, 1421-22 (1999). For more on abstention, see infra notes 154-58 and accompany-
ing text.
118. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 638-39 (2009).
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107.
120. See id. § 1291.
121. See, e.g., id. § 2253(c) (requiring a certificate of appealability in habeas corpus proceedings).
122. 551 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2007).
123. Id. at 218 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("A filing deadline is the paradigm of a claim-processing rule,
not of a delineation of cases that federal courts may hear, and so it falls outside the class of limitations
on subject-matter jurisdiction unless Congress says otherwise.").
124. See, e.g., Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007) (per curiam) ("[U]nder AEDPA,
[petitioner] was required to receive authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his second
challenge. Because he did not do so, the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it.").
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (civil certiorari); Sup. C. R. 13.1 (criminal certiorari).
126. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990) (civil case); Johnson v. Florida, 391 US.
596, 598 n.* (1968) (criminal case); see also ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 278-80
(7th ed. 1993) (explaining that the Court has long held the civil certiorari deadline to be jurisdictional
but the criminal certiorari deadline to be nonjurisdictional).
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The effects of each of these requirements are separate matters. Defects in the
mechanics of the appeal-even when those mechanics are jurisdictional-may
well be excusable for equitable reasons or subject to waiver or forfeiture. 127
Precisely what effects attend to each requirement are the product of positive
law, as devised by either Congress or the courts.
2. More Controversial Jurisdictional Examples
Original and appellate jurisdiction are uncontroversially characterized as
jurisdictional because they historically have been characterized as jurisdictional
and exhibit the effects that usually attend to jurisdictional doctrines. Other
doctrines are more controversial. This Section addresses personal jurisdiction,
venue, forum non conveniens, abstention, exhaustion, federal-state certification,
and the Federal Arbitration Act, all of which are jurisdictional.
a. Personal Jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction, despite its jurisdictional moni-
ker,128 imposes limits that can be waived or forfeited by the parties, or even
overridden by principles of equitable estoppel, 12 9 and courts need not police its
limits sua sponte. 13 0 As such, scholars have questioned its jurisdictional status. 1 3 1
The tension between personal jurisdiction's jurisdictional character and its
typically nonjurisdictional effects is alleviated, however, when jurisdiction is
untangled from its effects. If personal jurisdiction helps determine forum in a
multiforum system, then it is jurisdictional, and its waivability, forfeitability,
and susceptibility to equitable estoppel are entirely separate matters.
Though the Supreme Court's theory of personal jurisdiction is in some flux,
the historical idea of personal jurisdiction contained important intersovereign
features designed to manage competing state claims to adjudication. As the
infamous case Pennoyer v. Neff stated: "[E]very State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory," and
".no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory."1 3 2
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (allowing extensions or reopening of the deadline for equitable
reasons); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (creating the "collateral
order" exception to the finality requirement).
128. See Henderson ex rel Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011) (calling personal
jurisdiction jurisdictional); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (same).
129. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guin6e, 456 U.S. 694,
703-05 (1982).
130. See Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998).
131. See, e.g., Aaron R. Petty, Personal Jurisdiction as a Mandatory Rule, 44 U. MEM. L. REv. 1, 1
(2013) (arguing that "personal jurisdiction is not 'jurisdiction' at all").
132. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977) ("[A]ny attempt
'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and
exceed the inherent limits of the State's power."); cf Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY
L.J. 1, 1 (2010) (arguing that state sovereignty and interstate federalism justify the doctrine).
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Since then, personal jurisdiction has moved away from notions of territorial,
sovereign limits and toward notions of fairness and litigant rights, 13 3 though its
endgame is currently unclear. 13 4 The evolution and uncertainty of the doctrine's
justification, however, do not change its basic function, which is to help define
when one forum can hear a dispute and when another cannot.
The Court's recent general-jurisdiction cases make personal jurisdiction's
status as a doctrine of forum relationships clear. General or "all purpose"
jurisdiction exists to "afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain
forum in which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims."1 3 5
But the number of such forums is limited because other forums, such as the
forum where the cause of action arose, will also be available. 13 6 Even on the
world stage, personal jurisdiction is about forum relationships, helping define
boundaries and reduce friction between the authority of American courts and
the authority of international tribunals. 13 7 Personal jurisdiction is quintessen-
tially about determining forum in a multiforum system, even when litigant
rights inform or even dominate that analysis.
133. Ins. Corp. of Ir, 456 U.S. at 702 ("The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction
flows not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement
recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest."); id. at 702 (calling personal jurisdiction "a
restriction on judicial power ... as a matter of individual liberty"); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (allowing personal jurisdiction on grounds consistent with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also
Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw. U. L. REv. 1112, 1115-20 (1981) (finding the Due Process Clause to be the source for personal
jurisdiction). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (couching
personal jurisdiction "as an instrument of interstate federalism"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
251 (1958) (affirming that personal jurisdiction is "a consequence of territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States" in addition to "a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant
litigation").
134. Cf Bloom, supra note 70, at 982 ("No Court before Pennoyer had so knotted personal
jurisdiction's focus on federalist imperatives with a concern for individual fairness-and no Court has
untangled the two since." (footnotes omitted)). Compare J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.
873, 879-80 (2011) (plurality opinion) (characterizing personal jurisdiction as a limit on state sover-
eignty), and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757-58 (2014) (moving general jurisdiction
toward the more rigid, Pennoyer-type limits, while distancing general jurisdiction from abstract notions
of fairness), with Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 899-903 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing specific
jurisdiction as a doctrine of fairness and reasonableness).
135. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
136. See id. at 757-58 (interrelating specific and general jurisdiction); see also Mary Twitchell, The
Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 610, 676 (1988) (agreeing that general jurisdiction
need not be expansive when specific jurisdiction identifies an appropriate forum). Things get trickier
when no other forum exists. I address that scenario in Part III.
137. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762-63 (discussing the friction with international tribunals that broad
general jurisdiction would create). Things would be different if personal jurisdiction were uninformed
by the existence of alternate forum. Such a boundary would be indistinguishable from, say, standing
requirements, which I show to be nonjurisdictional below.
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b. Venue. Venue is no different, which is no surprise given that personal
jurisdiction and venue serve overlapping purposes. 138 Venue prescribes which
courts within a given judicial system can or should hear a case. 13 9 It disclaims
any limit on sovereign authority, but it still sifts forums based on connections
that the parties and events have with the available forums. 14 0 The federal venue
statute allocates cases across various federal districts within the federal judicial
system 41 and thus is the very depiction of a jurisdictional rule.
Even the nature of the phrasing of venue provisions (typically stating that a
civil action "may be brought," "shall not be brought," or "may only be brought"
in a particular district and that, if venue is improper, the district court "shall
dismiss") sounds similar to authorizations typically characterized as jurisdic-
tional. 14 2 I do not mean to contend that, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
Congress meant to make venue jurisdictional as it did for, say, appellate
jurisdiction. 143 1 merely suggest that the statutory phrasing indicates that venue
is meant to accomplish the same type of forum determination that would meet
my definition of jurisdiction. 144
Venue limitations are waivable and forfeitable, and venue can be consent-
able, 14 5 but a court may transfer the case to a more convenient forum sua
138. See Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal
Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 432 (1981).
139. See Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66 HASTINGs L.J. 675,
676 (2015).
140. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651-52 (1992).
141. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404 (2012).
142. Compare, e.g., id. § 1398(a) (stating that a certain civil action "shall be brought only in a
judicial district" specified in the statute), and Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11(b), 1 Stat. 73, 79
("[N]o civil suit shall be brought ... in any other district than that whereof [the defendant] is an
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ. . . ."), with, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 2107(a) (providing that "no appeal shall bring any judgment ... before a court of appeals for review
unless notice of appeal is filed").
143. Still, a jurisdictional characterization of venue is not inconsistent with the venue provisions. In
many specialized venue statutes, Congress actually uses the term "jurisdiction." See, e.g., Air Transpor-
tation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001)
(providing for the Southern District of New York as the "exclusive jurisdiction" to bring certain claims
related to the 9/11 attacks). In the general venue statute, Congress specifically stated that "[n]othing in
this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving a party who does not
interpose timely and sufficient objection to the venue," 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b), suggesting that a district
court has jurisdiction in an improper venue if a party forfeits his or her venue objections. That provision
confirms the forfeitability of venue objections, but because jurisdictional limits can be waivable, the
provision does not make venue nonjurisdictional. If anything, the use of the term "jurisdiction" in the
provision is consistent with the jurisdictional character of venue described here.
144. Perhaps this helps explain why many courts have characterized various venue provisions as
jurisdictional. See, e.g., Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 108 (1895) (characterizing a
local action rule as jurisdictional); George Neff Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure,
49 MICH. L. REv. 307, 310-23 (1951) (finding rampant conflation of venue and jurisdiction).
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (allowing venue to be transferred to any forum to which all
parties have consented); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (providing that objections to improper venue must be
made in the first responsive pleading or are waived); Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340
(1953) (confirming that parties can consent or waive objections to venue).
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sponte.1 4 6 Much like personal jurisdiction, these effects matter not to the
essential character of venue, which is jurisdictional because it determines forum
in a multiforum system. Congress simply has chosen, perhaps because of the
link between venue's normative purpose and the parties' interests, 14 7 to give the
jurisdictional doctrine of venue its particular constellation of effects.
c. Forum Non Conveniens. Forum non conveniens is, in large part, venue
across systems. 148 In the federal system, it typically is a matter of federal
common law and inherent judicial power rather than statute1 4 9 and enables a
federal court to dismiss the case so that a more convenient and appropriate
foreign forum can hear the case instead.1 5 0 The Court has made clear that forum
non conveniens is appropriate only "when an alternative forum has jurisdiction
to hear [a] case."15' The Court assumes that forum non conveniens is not
jurisdictional, in that its opinions often repeat that the doctrine is one of
discretion for a court that already has jurisdiction. 15 2 But the doctrine itself fits
comfortably into the identity of jurisdiction as the determination of forum in a
(global) multiforum system. 153 This fit remains comfortable even if, in a certain
case, a forum non conveniens dismissal presents a plaintiff with only impracti-
cal or legally burdensome alternative forums-a jurisdictional line may deter-
mine forum in a system of unequal forums. In addition, the discretionary
character of the doctrine is of no matter to its jurisdictional character. As long as
forum non conveniens sorts cases among forums, it is jurisdictional.
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
147. See id. (prescribing venue transfer "[flor the convenience of the parties and witnesses"); Ati.
Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S. Ct. 568, 580-81 (2013) (characterizing § 1404(a) as a
codified, intrasystem forum non conveniens).
148. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (calling forum non conveniens "[a]t
bottom, ... nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision"). But see Simona Grossi, Forum
Non Conveniens as a Jurisdictional Doctrine, 75 U. Pir. L. REv. 1, 3-4, 9 (2013) (noting significant
differences between a forum non conveniens dismissal and a venue transfer and typing forum non
conveniens as akin to personal jurisdiction as opposed to venue).
149. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitu-
tion, 86 IOWA L. REv. 735, 743 (2001).
150. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007). But see
Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.YU. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (calling for
its abolition).
151. Miller, 510 U.S. at 447-48 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981)); see
also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947); Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326
U.S. 549, 554-55 (1946) (explaining that a case might land "in one court when in fairness it should be
tried in another"); Grossi, supra note 148, at 16 (stating that the Court's cases have presumed the
"availability of a suitable alternate forum").
152. See, e.g., Miller, 510 U.S. at 447-48. Some courts have characterized a forum non conveniens
dismissal, somewhat confusingly, as "a deliberate abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction." See
Sinochern Int'l Co., 549 U.S. at 430 (parenthetically quoting the phrase from In re Papandreou, 139
F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
153. Cf Grossi, supra note 148 (making the case for forum non conveniens as a species of
jurisdiction). In addition, the doctrine is not normally thought of as waivable or consentable, and it can
be raised sua sponte by the court. See, e.g., Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos, S.A. de C.V.
v. M/T Respect, 89 F.3d 650, 656 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
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d. Abstention, Exhaustion, and Federal-State Certification. Abstention-a doc-
trine that allows a federal court to stay or dismiss a case so that a state or
administrative forum can hear it first-is much like forum non conveniens in
character (if not in justification). 154 A number of species of abstention exist,
including the following: Pullman, when an intervening state-court determina-
tion on an issue of state law might avoid the need for the federal court to decide
an issue of federal constitutional law;1 5 5 Burford, to avoid federal-court interfer-
ence with an intricate, sensitive, and important state regulatory regime when
competent state-court proceedings are available;1 5 6 Younger, prohibiting federal-
court interference with state criminal, civil-enforcement, or court-enforcement
proceedings;1 5 7 and Colorado River, to avoid duplicating concurrent parallel
state litigation. 15" Each represents the permission or compulsion of a court to
decline to proceed with its case so that some other forum can adjudicate one or
more of the same issues presented.
Exhaustion is abstention's younger sibling. It is a statutory or common-law
doctrine that forces a litigant to a different adjudicative tribunal-such as a state
court, a state agency, or a federal agency-before the litigant may be eligible for
federal court. 15 9 Whether exhaustion is required depends upon the rigidity of
any statutory requirement and the presence of discretionary factors, including
the likely delay, the adequacy of the other forum, and the potential futility of
relief in the other forum.1 6 0
Federal-state certification can be considered a kind of issue-based abstention.
Its availability and specifics depend upon state law,1 6' but the mechanism
generally gives a federal court the discretion to stay its proceedings while
asking the highest court of a state to resolve an uncertain issue of state law at
154. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996); see also Bloom, supra note 70,
at 991 (recognizing that "abstention is much like forum non conveniens"). Their justifications are quite
different: forum non conveniens is grounded in party and court convenience, while abstention typically
sounds in structural notions of federalism and administrative expertise. These differences may support
differences in attendant effects, but they do not support a difference in jurisdictional character.
155. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,498, 501 (1941).
156. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943).
157. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971). For the Court's most recent pronouncement, see
Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) (declining to apply Younger "simply
because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter").
158. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-20 (1976). For
criticism, see Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99,
101-09 (1986).
159. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) (habeas corpus exhaustion in state court); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (2012) (Title VII exhaustion before the EEOC); Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S.
210, 230 (1908) (judicially-required exhaustion rule).
160. 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4233, Westlaw (database
updated Apr. 2016).
161. Almost all states have enacted certification statutes. See Gregory L. Acquaviva, The Certifica-
tion of Unsettled Questions of State Law to State High Courts: The Third Circuit's Experience, 115
PENN. ST. L. REv. 377, 384-85 (2010) (reporting that all but North Carolina have certification statutes).
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issue in the federal proceeding. 16 2
Abstention, exhaustion, and federal-state certification have never been seen
as jurisdictional doctrines, perhaps because of their strong connections to
judicial discretion. 163 Yet because abstention, exhaustion, and federal-state certi-
fication determine when a federal forum is appropriate in light of available
alternative state or administrative forums, each is properly typed jurisdictional.
e. The Federal Arbitration Act. The Federal Arbitration Act requires federal
courts to, upon party request, stay judicial proceedings and order the parties to
arbitrate issues according to a preexisting, enforceable arbitration agreement
between the parties. 16 4 Upon conclusion of the arbitration, a party can seek
judicial review or confirmation of the arbitration award.16 5 These mechanisms
for enforcing arbitration and for allowing judicial review are jurisdictional
because they select between the arbitral forum and the court.
These doctrines all share a common feature: they determine forum in a
multiforum system. They therefore are properly described as jurisdictional.
It is true that the doctrines discussed in this Section further varied goals.
Abstention, exhaustion, and federal-state certification typically further systemic
goals like federalism, judicial competence, and docket control. Personal jurisdic-
tion and venue feature, at least in part, litigant goals of economy and conve-
nience. Forum non conveniens is a hybrid of public and private factors. The
Federal Arbitration Act implements a party-oriented goal and a judicial commit-
ment to the efficacy of arbitration. These justification differences perhaps
suggest that the doctrines should have varied effects.
Happily, the decoupling of effects from the jurisdictional label allows each
doctrine to correctly be typed jurisdictional while still exhibiting a tailored
constellation of effects that best suits it. Perhaps the system-centric abstention
or exhaustion doctrines, for example, should be less amenable to party waiver
than should the more litigant-centric doctrines of personal jurisdiction and
162. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1974). Certification has strong support in
the literature. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1459, 1465 (1997).
163. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202-03 (2007) (holding exhaustion to be nonjurisdictional);
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1989)
(characterizing abstention as nonjurisdictional); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch.,
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986) (stating that Younger is not jurisdictional). The nonjurisdictional and
discretionary status of abstention, in particular, has led to rich debates about its constitutionality and
propriety. For prominent positions, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention is Not
Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinction Between "Legitimate" and "Illegitimate" Statutory Interpreta-
tion and Judicial Lawmaking, 107 Nw. U. L. REv. 847 (2013); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue:
The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1990); Martin H. Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984);
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985).
164. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (2012).
165. Id. §§ 9-12.
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venue or the Federal Arbitration Act. Likewise, some doctrines might be subject
to equitable exceptions or discretion while others might not.
I do not mean to try to attach the right set of effects to each doctrine here. I
leave that to Congress and, when appropriate, the courts. Rather, my point is
that factors other than the doctrine's jurisdictional status should dictate the
appropriate effects attendant to each doctrine. The result is that these doctrines
are all jurisdictional, even if they have different sets of effects.
3. A Nonjurisdictional Example: Standing
I would be remiss not to address a prominent nonjurisdictional doctrine to
contrast with the jurisdictional doctrines. The easy questions-statutes of limita-
tions, caps on damages, qualified immunity, service, and the like-need little
explanation. But I think it appropriate to address the tougher sell of a doctrine
typically considered to be jurisdictional: standing.
Stemming from the Constitution's grant to the courts of adjudicatory author-
ity over "cases" and "controversies," 1 6 6 standing reinforces the need for federal
courts to act as courts, both to avoid appearing to be an oversight or advisory
board1 6 7 and to guard against deciding a case without reliable adversity between
the parties. 6 8 Standing, then, simply ensures that the court act like a court.169
And it secures the separation of powers by preventing the judiciary from
encroaching into legislative or executive prerogatives.1 7 0
In the context of a dispute, the standing requirements are focused on the
parties and their claims. Standing requires that the plaintiff have suffered a real,
concrete, and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's
conduct and that may be judicially redressed.1 7 ' Revealingly, these require-
ments approximate merits questions. 1 72 They speak only to the court at hand
and ask whether the court can offer relief to this particular plaintiff for this
166. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
167. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-60 (fearing having "the federal courts as virtually continuing
monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive Action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress
acting through its committees and the 'power of the purse'; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent
actual present or immediately threatened injury" (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)));
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 (1792) (declining to provide an advisory opinion to Congress
because it is "not of a judicial nature").
168. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972) (stating that the injury component of
standing is a "rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of
those who have a direct stake in the outcome").
169. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (stating that standing respects "the proper-and properly limited-
role of the courts" (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
170. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (stating that
transgressing standing would "distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and
the Legislature").
171. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014); Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
172. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 238 (1988) (providing
two examples where the courts were able to decide standing issues by resolving whether, on the merits,
legal protections were available).
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particular claim. Much like limitations periods and damages caps, the standing
factors simply impose limitations on the particular court's ability to grant relief.
They do not define boundaries between adjudicative forums or help allocate the
case among forums. 1 7 3
Counterarguments that standing is about allocating disputes1 7 4 are supported
by language from some Supreme Court cases1 7 5 and have some force in the
public-interest/generalized-grievance context, in which legislative relief is pos-
sible.17 6 But legislative relief is not adjudicative relief, and it cannot be said that
the possibility that Congress might repeal a law, or that an agency might
regulate differently, makes the political process an alternative forum to a lawsuit
asking a court to declare a law unconstitutional or an agency action unlawful.
The issues are not the same. Congress and the Executive consider policies and
political expediencies, not (usually) unconstitutionality or legality. By contrast,
it is the duty of the courts to adjudicate questions of constitutionality and
legality and to avoid questions of policy and politics.1 7 7 Congress and the courts
are not different forums for the same dispute; rather, they are different branches
resolving different kinds of disputes. 1 7  Were jurisdiction so broad, it would
apply equally to issues of statutory coverage, statutes of limitations, and the
like, because those all restrict court relief but leave open the possibility of
statutory reform by Congress. Jurisdiction is not so expansive. Accordingly,
standing is a limit on the authority of a federal court as a court. It is about
inter-branch friction and the proper role of the federal courts, but it is not about
jurisdiction. 179
The Court has characterized Article III standing as jurisdictional under the
traditional power-based and effects-tied understanding of the term. 8 o But char-
173. Many standing cases recognize the possibility that standing limits may deprive a case of any
forum. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) ("It can be argued that if
respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so."). For critiques of this outcome, see
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and
Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 247, 297-306 (1988); Scott Michelman,
Who Can Sue Over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REv. 71 (2009).
174. See Lees, supra note 56, at 1482 ("[T]he entire concept [of separation of powers] revolves
around deciding what legal issues are appropriate for which branch of government to decide.").
175. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("'[A]bstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to
'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared . .. [are] most appropriately addressed in the representa-
tive branches." (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975))).
176. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 ("Vindicating the public interest ... is the function of
Congress and the Chief Executive."). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432 (1988).
177. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
178. A doctrine that does determine whether a dispute should be heard by Congress or the courts
would be jurisdictional. Some features of the political-question doctrine are possibilities. See infra text
accompanying notes 210-23.
179. But see Lees, supra note 56, at 1481-82 (typing standing as jurisdictional because it structur-
ally separates the courts from the political branches).
180. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998); United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737, 742 (1995). Standing defects can be raised at any time, and the courts have a sua sponte
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acterizing standing as jurisdictional causes tensions with sister doctrines derived
from Article III, including "prudential" standing (which some deem a nonjuris-
dictional creation of the courts)," ripeness (which can, at times, be waived by
the parties), 18 2 and mootness (which contains judicially created exceptions). 18 3
These tensions have created divisions within the Court and among commenta-
tors about the jurisdictional status of standing and its related doctrines. The
Court has, for example, attempted to distinguish mootness from standing largely
on the grounds that, if there is an exception to mootness, then it cannot be
jurisdictional as standing is. 18 4 Commentators are split, with some contending
that mootness is entirely prudential1 5 and others arguing that the jurisdictional
stature depends upon the particular mooting event. 1 8 6
A jurisdictional identity that focuses on forum determination disconnected
from effects resolves these tensions. All of these standing doctrines do the same
thing: limit the authority and role of the court without regard to any other
forum's availability to hear the dispute.18 7 They are all, therefore, nonjurisdic-
tional. But they need not all have the same set of effects. Therefore, Article III
standing can have all the typical jurisdictional effects (despite being nonjurisdic-
tional), mootness can admit judicial exceptions, and ripeness can be waivable.
Viewed through the refocused lens of jurisdiction, existing standing doctrine is
more coherent than it otherwise would seem.
4. Sovereign Immunity and Political Questions
Two important doctrines remain: sovereign immunity and the political-
question doctrine. These doctrines cannot be fairly characterized at present. The
obligation to ensure standing requirements are met. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000).
181. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (noting a circuit split); cf Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1377, 1386-88 (2014) (recharacterizing some components of prudential standing as merits questions).
182. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010). Ripeness can,
however, be raised by the court sua sponte. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18
(1993).
183. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)
(reaffirming the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529
U.S. 277, 288 (2000) (reaffirming the "voluntary cessation" exception).
184. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 190 ("[I]f mootness were simply 'standing set in a
time frame,' the exception to mootness that arises when the defendant's allegedly unlawful activity is
'capable of repetition, yet evading review,' could not exist."); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (contending that, because it has its exceptions, mootness must be
prudential rather than jurisdictional or constitutional).
185. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REv. 603, 609 (1992).
186. See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
562, 565 (2009).
187. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (finding that
ripeness derives from Article III); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975) (aligning Article III
and prudential standing); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam) (stating that
mootness derives from Article III).
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reason is that each doctrine acts jurisdictional at times and nonjurisdictional at
other times.
a. Sovereign Immunity. Sovereign immunity is based on the longstanding
principle that sovereigns cannot be sued without their consent."" The principle,
as applied to the states, has been constitutionalized by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, which states that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend" to certain suits against states.189 The Court has been
unclear whether the doctrine is jurisdictional,1 90 especially in light of the
well-settled feature of waivability,1 91 the judicially created exception of Ex
parte Young, 192 and the option, but not obligation, of a court to raise immunity
sua sponte. 1 93
Some historical roots of sovereign immunity seem to make it nonjurisdic-
tional. If the sovereign can do no wrong because everything the sovereign does
188. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent."); William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 2017) ("Sovereign immunity is a government's right not to be haled into court without its
consent."). For some of the many important contributions to the sovereign-immunity literature, see, for
example, Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Bradford R.
Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1817 (2010); William
A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033
(1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); John F Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the
Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1342 (1989).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
190. Compare OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 398 (2015) ("OBB has [foreign]
sovereign immunity under the Act, and accordingly the courts of the United States lack jurisdiction
over the suit."), Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (stating that state sovereign immunity
"sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court"),
United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513-15 (1940) (finding that, absent consent,
"attempted exercise of judicial power [over a sovereign] is void"), and Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 330 (1934) (stating that state sovereign immunity is a restriction on jurisdiction), with Wis. Dep't
of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391-92 (1998) (stating that whether Eleventh Amendment immunity
is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction is "a question we have not decided"), and Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (calling the Eleventh Amendment an "immunity from
suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the Federal Judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction").
191. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. Of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (implied waiver);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Spending Clause waiver); Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (consent). For a comprehensive treatment, see generally
Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment,
52 DuKE L.J. 1167 (2003).
192. 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908); see also Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S.
247, 260 (2011) (calling Ex parte Young an "exception" to state sovereign immunity).
193. See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "courts need not raise the
issue sua sponte").
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is by definition lawful, 194 or because a sovereign's subject who acts unlawfully
no longer represents the sovereign, 195 then suits against the sovereign should be
dismissed on merits grounds. The issue is not one of court jurisdiction but one
of lawful conduct.
The modern justification of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, at least in the
context of state sovereign immunity, is to protect a state from the indignity of
compelled appearance in certain suits and under certain conditions, irrespective
of forum. 196 This justification makes state sovereign immunity akin to official
immunity or even a statutory-coverage issue that makes the plaintiff unable to
sue this particular defendant. Under either the historical conceptualization or the
modern justification, immunity is nonjurisdictional because it is about the
parties and the claim rather than the forum. 197
If, however, sovereign immunity is about forum selection, then a jurisdic-
tional characterization is appropriate. Justice Brennan famously adopted the
position that the Eleventh Amendment was meant to restrict the grant of
diversity jurisdiction in Article III.198 If that is the case, then sovereign immu-
nity restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts alone, leaving state courts open to
hear the suit. Such a conceptualization turns sovereign immunity into a limit
much like the forum-defendant rule of removal 99 or even personal jurisdiction.2 00
The Court's development of state sovereign immunity has rejected the sover-
eign-can-do-no-wrong theory and Justice Brennan's diversity-restricting theory
but has embraced the immunity-conferring theory 20 1 such that state sovereign
immunity applies regardless of forum. But there is one forum in which the
Court has held immunity not to apply: that of sister state courts.202 It would be
an odd result that state sovereign immunity determines forum by selecting sister
194. See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("A sovereign is exempt from suit,
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.").
195. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 (1984).
196. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760, 769 (2002) (applying state
sovereign immunity to an administrative proceeding); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748-49, 754
(1999) (applying the Eleventh Amendment's principle of state sovereign immunity in state court).
197. Diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction are also about the parties and the claim,
respectively. Cases barred by sovereign immunity, however, cannot be brought in any forum, whereas
cases that fail diversity or federal-question jurisdiction can still be brought in state court. Diversity and
federal-question jurisdiction, then, use the identity of the parties and the claim to determine forum,
whereas sovereign immunity uses them to end the lawsuit regardless of forum.
198. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 260-61 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012) (barring an in-state defendant from removing a case based on
diversity jurisdiction).
200. For the argument that components of state sovereign immunity are doctrines of personal
jurisdiction, see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV.
L. REv. 1559, 1574-75 (2002).
201. See supra note 196; Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n.24 (1997) ("Although we have
adopted the related doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common law fiction that [the sovereign can do
no wrong] was rejected at the birth of the Republic."); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
55-57 (1996).
202. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 428-29 (1979) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
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state courts as the sole forum among other plausible forums for a particular
lawsuit. But as long as Nevada v. Hall remains viable, state sovereign immunity
could be thought of as a jurisdictional doctrine that isolates sister state courts as
the proper forum among other state courts and federal adjudicative bodies. Hall
faces a dubious future, however, and if the Court overrules it, then the Court
will solidify state sovereign immunity's status as a nonjurisdictional doctrine
that applies regardless of forum.2 0 3
Federal sovereign immunity, because of the Supremacy Clause, applies equally
in both state and federal courts and thus is generally a nonjurisdictional immu-
nity doctrine because it limits the viability of a claim rather than determines the
forum. 2 0 4 Thus, for example, the Court in Scarborough v. Principi was correct
to characterize as nonjurisdictional a requirement of a petition for attorney's
fees in a successful suit against the United States. 205
But some federal sovereign-immunity waivers can operate to determine
forum among federal courts, much like venue rules do. Congress has waived
sovereign immunity by authorizing certain suits against the United States in, for
example, the FTCA.20 6 Although the substantive waiver of immunity is not a
jurisdictional event, the allocation of cases authorized to various forums is
jurisdictional. Thus, the exhaustion requirement of the FTCA is jurisdictional
because it forces a dispute to a particular forum in a multiforum system.2 0 7 So
too is the amount-in-controversy limit for exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of
Federal Claims (as opposed to concurrent jurisdiction with the federal district
courts).2 0 8
State sovereign immunity and federal sovereign immunity thus are ambiva-
lent doctrines. State sovereign immunity appears to be in the midst of its own
identity crisis that continues to defy resolution. 2 0 9 Federal sovereign immunity,
meanwhile, is basically a nonjurisdictional doctrine whose mechanics can be
jurisdictional in a venue-like selection of forum. At this time, however, neither
doctrine is capable of firm and holistic characterization.
b. Political-Question Doctrine. The political-question doctrine requires a fed-
eral court that otherwise has jurisdiction to dismiss the case based on a number
203. See Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 135 S. Ct. 2940 (2015) (mem.) (granting certiorari on the
question of whether Hall should be overruled); see also Baude, supra note 188 ("[A]t oral argument the
Justices seemed prepared to overrule Hall."). For a critique of Hall, see generally Ann Woolhandler,
Interstate Sovereign Immunity, 2006 Sup. CT. REv. 249.
204. This characterization of federal sovereign immunity is contrary to some precedent. See supra
note 190. For a history of federal sovereign immunity, see Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of
Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 439, 443-56 (2005).
205. See 541 U.S. 401, 413-15 (2004).
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
207. See id. § 2675.
208. Id. § 1346.
209. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1280-81 (2016) (dividing 4-4 on
whether Hall should be overruled).
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of factors. 2 1 0 The Court has repeatedly typed the doctrine as nonjurisdic-
tional,2 1  but the doctrine is actually a jurisdictional hybrid because it vacillates
between two core strands: an abstention strand that allocates dispute authority
between the courts and coordinate branches and a kind of standing strand that
sequesters the courts within their judicial functions. Which strand takes priority
depends upon the case.2 12
In Nixon v. United States, for example, the Court confronted an impeached
federal judge's challenge to a Senate rule that allowed a Senate committee to
hear evidence against an impeached official.2 13 The judge argued that the
delegation of the evidentiary process to a committee violated the Constitution's
commitment of the "sole Power to try all Impeachments" 2 14 to the Senate as a
whole.2 15
The Court held the matter to be a nonjusticiable political question for three
main reasons. First, the Constitution appeared to commit the question of how to
"try" an impeachment to the Senate (and, by implication, to deny the question to
the courts). 2 16 This political-question factor-a textual commitment to a coordi-
nate branch-seems to describe constitutional divisions of adjudicative author-
ity that could properly be called jurisdictional.2 1 7
But the Court also found nonjusticiability on the grounds that the meaning of
the word "try" in the impeachment setting "lacks sufficient precision to afford
any judicially manageable standard of review," 2 18 that the Senate's impeach-
ment proceedings demanded a compelling need for finality, and that fashioning
judicial relief was too difficult. 2 19 These political-question factors-the lack of
judicially manageable standards, the overriding need for finality to a coordinate
branch's action, and the difficulty of affording judicial relief-do not describe a
210. Although the doctrine is much older, see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), for the
classic treatment of the doctrine, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
211. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 198-99.
212. The doctrine's duality has spawned great debates about the nature of the doctrine and its
legitimacy. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 125-26 (1962) (favoring the judicial-functions factors); HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 11-14 (1961) (favoring the textual-commitment factor); Martin H.
Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031, 1058-59 (1984)
(concluding that neither is legitimate); Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested
Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1523 (2005) (suggesting alternate criteria); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 142-43 (2001)
(arguing for a reverse-Bickelian view that prudential considerations in momentous political cases
justify judicial intervention).
213. 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
215. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228.
216. Id. at 229-36.
217. See Zivotofsky ex rel Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1431 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that, when the textual-commitment factor is
implicated, "abstention is warranted because the court lacks authority to resolve that issue").
218. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230. For exposition of this factor, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275 (2006).
219. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236.
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division of adjudicative authority but instead, like standing elements, attempt to
keep the courts within their core competence of exercising a judicial func-
tion. 2 2 0 They are nonjurisdictional.
These two sets of justifications for the political-question doctrine-one that
sounds in jurisdiction and one that does not-mean that jurisdiction's identity
cannot conclusively resolve the political-question doctrine's jurisdictional char-
acterization. Perhaps the doctrine's ambivalence counsels in favor of parsing the
doctrine more carefully in a given case. If, in a certain case, the application of
the political-question doctrine depends upon the "textual commitment" factor,
then it is jurisdictional.2 2 1 If, instead, the applicability of the doctrine hinges on
the "judicial functions" factors, it is nonjurisdictional.22 2
I suppose there could be a case in which both sets of factors are necessary for
the doctrine to apply, in which case the different justifications would become
too blurred to resolve the jurisdiction-characterization question even in the
context of a specific case. Perhaps such a case would involve a true "quasi-
jurisdictional" hybrid. But the Court's recent narrowing of the political-question
doctrine223 suggests that, should such cases exist, they would be rare indeed. In
any event, as I explain more fully in Section II.D below, the parties, at least,
could take comfort that the effects of the doctrine, which are far more important
in an individual case, should be unaffected by the inability to classify the
political-question doctrine as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.
C. REVISITING JURISDICTIONALITY PRECEDENT
The realignment of jurisdictional doctrines resuscitates some lines of prec-
edent and requires reconsideration of others.
One surprising resuscitation is of the now-discredited phrase "mandatory and
jurisdictional," so often reiterated in the time of United States v. Robinson in
appellate-requirement cases. 2 24 Recent cases have derided Robinson's and its
progeny's uses of the term as "drive-by" jurisdictional rulings because the
"jurisdictional" characterizations are unnecessary.225 Commentary has also shown
that, under a conception of jurisdiction as tied to a fixed set of effects, the term
"mandatory" is redundant because a jurisdictional characterization necessarily
220. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432-33 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
221. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-22 (1969) (holding that a challenge to
congressional action as unconstitutional under the Qualifications Clause was justiciable because the
Constitution did not commit the question to Congress).
222. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (holding political-affiliation gerrymander-
ing to be a political question because of the lack of judicially manageable standards).
223. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1427 (calling the political-question doctrine "a narrow exception"
to the duty to adjudicate).
224. See 361 U.S. 220 (1960); supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
225. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005) (per curiam); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998).
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implies a mandatory characterization.22 6 In either event, both terms are not
needed.
But my proposal gives independent meaning to both terms. "Jurisdictional"
is descriptively accurate because the appellate requirements define whether a
case is in district court or appellate court. Meanwhile, "mandatory" speaks to
the particular effect of the limit at issue in the cases.2 27 A statement of the
mandatory effect is independently necessary because the descriptive term "juris-
dictional" does not inexorably have mandatory effect on the parties and the
court. Thus, the phrase "mandatory and jurisdictional" addresses both the
narrow effect of the appellate requirement in a way that resolves the case
("mandatory") and the significance of the appellate requirement to the structural
relationship between the district and appellate courts ("jurisdictional").
In reality, Robinson and its progeny did perpetuate profligate and unthinking
use of the jurisdictional label, and those cases can be maligned for that reason.
But there is no need to now discredit them and thereby perpetuate the secondary
error of jurisdiction's identity crisis. Instead, those cases can be reformed to
support a more coherent jurisdictional theory. Viewed through the lens of
jurisdiction's descriptive identity decoupled from its effects, the cases' use of
both "mandatory" and "jurisdictional" is accurate and appropriate.
At the same time, the Court's newer jurisdictionality precedents-the cases
discussed above in Part I that have developed a jurisdiction-characterization
doctrine 22-warrant reconsideration because the line of cases they form is
beholden to an identity of jurisdiction that cannot withstand scrutiny. These
cases are wrong to look to Congress to determine if a limit is jurisdictional,
wrong to distinguish between claims-processing and jurisdictional-power rules,
and wrong to tie a set of effects to the jurisdictional label.
Some of the decisions, nevertheless, reach the correct result. Kontrick, Eber-
hart, Scarborough, Arbaugh, and Reed Elsevier, for example, are all correct in
their nonjurisdictional characterizations because the laws at issue in those cases
did not attempt to draw boundary lines between institutions but rather imposed
limitations on the court's authorization to grant relief.2 2 9
226. See Dane, supra note 18, at 37 ("Jurisdictional requirements are-as must already be apparent-
mandatory."); id. at 57 (concluding that in phrases such as "mandatory and jurisdictional," jurisdiction
"enters as a label, but is not itself the object of analysis"); Hall, supra note 18, at 409 (suggesting that
the term "jurisdictional" merely emphasizes the rigidity of the "mandatory" label).
227. See Dodson, supra note 111, at 646-48.
228. See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
229. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010) (holding nonjurisdictional the
Copyright Act's registration precondition to filing a claim); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
513-14 (2006) (holding the employee-numerosity requirement of Title VII to be nonjurisdictional);
Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 13 (characterizing as nonjurisdictional the deadline in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33 for filing a motion for a new trial in a criminal case); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
452-54 (2004) (holding nonjurisdictional the deadline in Bankruptcy Rule 4004 for filing objections to
a debtor's discharge); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-14 (2004) (holding nonjurisdictional
a requirement for eligibility for attorney's fees against the federal government). Two other correctly
decided cases are Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010) (holding
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Others, however, reach the wrong result. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen, for example, is incorrect
in holding that the settlement-conference precondition to labor-dispute arbi-
tration is nonjurisdictional. 30 Instead, the requirement is jurisdictional be-
cause it defines when the dispute must be negotiated in a settlement conference
and when it may go to arbitration. Similarly, Henderson v. Shinseki, which held
nonjurisdictional the deadline to appeal the denial of veterans' benefits to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,23 1 was incorrect because the dead-
line marks the transition of the case from the Veterans' Board to the Veterans'
Court.
Still others correctly label the law but fail to appreciate the disconnect
between the law's label and its effects. Bowles v. Russell, for example, is correct
in its jurisdictional characterization of the deadline to file a civil notice of
appeal but not in its reasoning that the jurisdictional status necessarily precludes
equitable exceptions.2 32 Whether the appellate deadline allows equitable excep-
tions is a question of positive law-a routine question of statutory interpretation-
not a product of its jurisdictional character, as Bowles suggested.2 33
Still others are correct in both characterization and effect but offer unwise
dictum. In Day v. McDonough, for example, the Court correctly concluded that
the habeas limitations defense is not jurisdictional and reasonably concluded
that, nevertheless, a district court could raise the defense sua sponte.23 But the
Court also stated that because the defense was nonjurisdictional, courts had no
obligation to raise the defense sua sponte.235 Day's dictum thus perpetuates the
erroneous stereotype that nonjurisdictional rules lack certain effects, whereas
jurisdictional rules have them.
D. LITIGATION PRACTICE
Jurisdictional lines are important for systemic reasons of identifying where
the boundaries between forums are and how the various forums relate to each
other in the context of a particular case. The parties and the courts need to
know, for example, when a case is in the district court and when it has moved
into the appellate court. But the legal characterization of that boundary as
jurisdictional often will not matter to the individual parties in any given
litigation. That is because the parties are likely to be far more concerned about
nonjurisdictional a statute's limits in extraterritorial application), and Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding nonjurisdictional the deadline to file a Title VII charge with the
EEOC). The EEOC's right-to-sue letter, however, is a jurisdictional requirement because it signals the
movement of the case from the authority of the EEOC to the authority of the district court. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1)-(3) (2012).
230. See 556 U.S. 67, 83 (2009).
231. 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011).
232. See 551 U.S. 205, 212-14 (2007).
233. See id. at 214.
234. 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006).
235. Id.
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the particular instrumental effects of a limit, such as whether and when noncom-
pliance with the limit can be raised, and whether exceptions can be argued.
Were those effects tied to the jurisdictional character of the limit, then the
characterization question would be important. But because those effects are
disconnected from the jurisdictional character of the limit, the more important
issues for the parties will usually center just on the effects.
The identity for jurisdiction I offer here presents a practical approach for
litigation. Litigation over a judicial limit should focus far less on its jurisdic-
tional character and far more closely on the limit's effects. Currently, the
litigation approach is the opposite: the Court routinely focuses primarily on the
jurisdictional character and only secondarily-and sometimes not at all-on
the effects.2 36 Inverting that approach so that the focus is on the limit's effects
allows for more careful attention to more relevant questions of constitutional
interpretation, statutory interpretation, or underlying policies, depending upon
the positive-law source of the limit.
Take Bowles v. Russell, for example. The entire issue in the case was whether
the deadline to file a notice of appeal was susceptible to an equitable exception
based on the unique circumstance of a district court order purporting to extend
the deadline for the appellant.23 7 The Court's approach was to inquire whether
the deadline was jurisdictional, an approach that the Court used as a conditional
proxy for the question presented. 2 38 The Court should have taken the more
direct effects-based approach of inquiring whether such an equitable exception
could apply.
It is not enough, then, for a court simply to declare a limit to be imposed by
Article III and thereby conclude that the rote effects of jurisdiction necessarily
follow. Nor may a court declare a rule nonjurisdictional and thereby conclude
that the parties have control over the rule's application. Instead, the parties and
court must focus on the specific effect at issue, thereby reserving their time and
effort to adjudicate broader questions of jurisdictionality and avoiding unneces-
sary adjudications of other effects not presented by the case at hand.
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS
This Part anticipates and considers some counterarguments to my rehabilita-
tion of jurisdiction's identity.
236. See, e.g., Henderson, 562 U.S. at 442 n.4 (refusing, after holding the deadline at issue to be
nonjurisdictional, to decide the actual issue in the case: whether the deadline was subject to equitable
tolling).
237. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207-08.
238. Id. at 213-14. The Court held formalistically that, because the deadline was jurisdictional, no
equitable exceptions could apply. Id. at 214. That is, of course, logically fallacious under my
rehabilitated identity of jurisdiction, which lacks such a defined set of effects. But even under the
conventional understanding of jurisdiction, had the Court instead found the deadline to be nonjurisdic-
tional, it might still have had to reach the effects question anyway. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S.
462, 480-82, 503 (2011) (holding first that a limit was nonjurisdictional and then resolving whether it
was waivable).
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A. SIMPLICITY
One objection might be that a jurisdictional identity decoupled from effects
causes too much disruption in doctrine and complication in litigation. If the
jurisdiction label leads to a defined set of effects, then a jurisdictional character-
ization becomes the primary inquiry and, having resolved the inquiry in favor of
jurisdiction, obviates the need to consider the myriad effects a particular limit
might exhibit. Staying the current course might be far simpler.
But nothing about jurisdiction-including the current approach-is simple.2 39
As shown above, jurisdiction is showing signs of becoming unstable, and it is
unclear in light of United States v. Wong how the Court will maintain consis-
tency going forward. 2 4 0 The Court has no solution if Congress tries to mark as
jurisdictional a rule that is squarely a claim-processing rule. Nor does the
Court's approach accommodate a jurisdictional statute that attempts to impose
fewer than all the expected effects of the jurisdictional label. Sometimes,
Congress uses the jurisdictional label in a "drive-by" fashion, 2 41 and sometimes
Congress means to make something jurisdictional but fails to use the magic
word.24 2 Indeed, that the Court has seen fit to take at least one jurisdictional-
characterization case per year for the last decade suggests that, at the least, the
lower courts are struggling.24 3 It is a mistake to conclude that the current
approach is simple.244
Current jurisdictional doctrine also exacerbates the doctrinal tensions I ex-
posed above. Current doctrine cannot explain how personal jurisdiction and
federal sovereign immunity can be both jurisdictional and waivable.2 45 It cannot
explain the judicial exceptions to mootness. 2 4 6 It has inconsistently character-
ized state sovereign immunity.247 These rifts demonstrate that the current
approach to jurisdiction has its own deep complexities.
At the same time, it is hard to see why my proposal is any more complicated
or disruptive. In many cases, the court and the parties can bypass the jurisdic-
tional-characterization question altogether and instead focus entirely on the
particular effect at issue. If a rule is nonjurisdictional, then my approach is even
simpler than the Court's because my approach has only one inquiry (the effect),
whereas the Court's must pass through the (perhaps complicated) jurisdictional-
239. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REv. 1, 3 (2011) ("[T]he
reality is that jurisdictional clarity is largely a chimera, done in by its own inherent complexities.").
240. See 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); see also supra Section I.B.4.
241. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
242. See, e.g., Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209-11.
243. See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
244. For focused discussion of the complexities that the Court's jurisdictional-characterization
doctrine produces, see Dodson, supra note 239, at 37-38.
245. For an attempt, see Dodson, supra note 9, at 1457-58.
246. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 393, 490 (1996) (calling mootness "incomprehensible").
247. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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characterization question just to reach the effects question.2
It is true that holding a rule to be jurisdictional under current doctrine does
obviate the need to consider effects. 24 9 But the effects inquiry ought not be
unduly complicated. Discerning the effects of a statutory or rule-based limit is a
routine matter of statutory interpretation,2 50 perhaps no less complicated than
the parsing of "text, context, and historical treatment" necessary to find a rule to
be jurisdictional.25 1 One need only compare the Court's struggle with the
current approach in United States v. Wong2 5 2 to the relative ease the Court had
with its effects-only approach in its unanimous Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin v. United States2 5 3 decision to determine which is the simpler inquiry.
It also is true that my proposal would drastically reorient doctrine and call
many cases into question. But the real question in most cases hinges on effects.
Changing the character of venue, for example, from nonjurisdictional to jurisdic-
tional does not change the effects that already attach to venue. Thus, although
jurisdiction's new identity would move away from language in cases calling
venue nonjurisdictional, it would not change the real-world litigation effects
that venue currently exhibits. At the same time, the doctrinal reorientation
would drastically improve simplicity, clarity, coherence, and consistency going
forward.
Finally, my proposal is by far the more accurate. Perhaps in some circum-
stances it is "more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
it be settled right."2 54 But not here. Indeed, the Court itself conceded the
necessity of disrupting precedent to pursue accuracy when it began distancing
itself from United States v. Robinson2 5 5 and the thousands of decisions that used
the jurisdictional label in a "drive-by jurisdictional" ruling.2 56 The Court is
right. Accuracy is important in the jurisdictional field, even at the expense of
some clarity and simplicity.2 5 7 And my rehabilitation of jurisdiction offers the
best way forward.
248. Compare United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1638 (2015) (resolving a complicated
jurisdictional-characterization issue in favor of nonjurisdictionality), with Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty.,
493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (holding a statutory limit to be mandatory without reaching the jurisdictional
question).
249. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2007).
250. See, e.g., Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016) (using federal
common law to determine if equitable tolling applies); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
817, 829 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("The Court quite properly observes that the question
whether equitable tolling is available turns on congressional intent.").
251. The Court's clear-statement presumption against jurisdiction, see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006), is hardly simplifying, but, even were it simplifying, nothing prevents the
Court from developing exactly the same presumptions for effects, see, e.g., Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (developing a presumption of equitable tolling).
252. 135 S. Ct. at 1632-38; id. at 1640-43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
253. 136 S. Ct. 750.
254. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
255. 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
256. See supra note 18.
257. See Dodson, supra note 239.
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B. POSITIVIST JURISDICTION
A second objection might concede that my proposal for jurisdiction is all fine
and well but note that it runs up against the numerous references to "jurisdic-
tion" in the Constitution, statutes, and elsewhere. If those references are inconsis-
tent with the identity of jurisdiction proposed here, they could make practical
rehabilitation of jurisdiction insurmountably difficult. In other words, the ves-
tiges of a positivist identity of jurisdiction lingering in both the Constitution and
in statutes could stymie my attempt to move away from that identity.
As for statutes, there are likely to be few uses of the term inconsistent with
jurisdiction's identity. Congress rarely uses the term jurisdiction, but, when it
does, Congress seems to use it in a way that is consistent with my proposal. For
uses with questionable consistency, charitable interpretations are usually pos-
sible.2 58 For the few remaining instances of true conflict, courts can disregard
the term on the ground that Congress itself used the term in the same unthink-
ing, "drive-by" way that the Court has used it in the past25 9 and invite amend-
ment to restore consistency with jurisdiction's identity. And because the net
effect of disregarding Congress's use of the term is merely to recharacterize the
statute descriptively rather than alter any of its effects, the litigation implica-
tions should be minimal.
The Constitution presents a more difficult situation because amendment is an
unrealistic solution. Fortunately, no constitutional reference creates an inconsis-
tency. Article III's reference to the "judicial Power" need not mean "jurisdic-
tion." 2 6 0 The Constitution does distinguish between "original Jurisdiction" and
"appellate Jurisdiction,",2 61 but this usage is consistent with the idea of jurisdic-
tion as determining forum in a multiforum system. Article III, then, is consistent
with jurisdiction's descriptive identity.
The word jurisdiction also appears in Article IV, which states:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the
executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.262
This use of the term jurisdiction is also consistent because, much like
personal jurisdiction, it determines forum for the dispute among the multiforum
system of state authorities.
258. The removal statute presents this opportunity. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
259. The Court has used this tactic even under its current approach. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998). For commentary, see Wasserman, supra note 3, at 960-61.
260. U.S. CONST. art. III. For a contrary view, see Clark, supra note 188, at 1833 (stating that a limit
on "'the Judicial power' . . . limits all forms of jurisdiction recognized by Article III").
261. Id. art. III, §2.
262. Id. art. IV, § 2.
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The only other mention of the term jurisdiction in the Constitution is the most
peculiar. Article IV goes on to state:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor
any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of
the Congress.2 6 3
This use of the term reflects the more colloquial meaning of sovereign
territory rather than the legal meaning pertaining to forum adjudication that I
have focused on. The quite distinct circumstances of this provision ought to
lessen any confusion caused by the dual usage. In addition, I note that even this
provision uses the term as a relational term, speaking not just to one state but
rather anticipating and accommodating the equality that should attend all states
of the Union. For all these reasons, the Constitution's use of the term does not
undermine the theory I advance here.
CONCLUSION
The time has come, once again, to focus on jurisdiction. I offer a conceptual-
ization of jurisdiction that is descriptive and functional, that determines forum
in a multiforum system by drawing boundaries between and around different
forums, and that is decoupled from any unique or immutable set of effects. This
conceptualization leads to a more coherent categorization of various doctrines,
resolves many doctrinal inconsistencies, and enables tailored application of
effects.
The challenge will be in implementation, but small steps forward are immedi-
ately attainable and can lead to greater change over time. Courts, Congress,
commentators, and even litigants should reserve use of the term for those
occasions when the law makes determinations among multiple forums and not
use the term when the law speaks to a single forum in isolation. They should
stop treating jurisdiction as something sacred, as "power," or as tied to immu-
table effects, and instead focus on what the effects of a particular law are or
should be. With thoughtfulness and attention, we might finally discover what
jurisdiction means.
263. Id. art. IV, § 3.
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